Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

如何在课堂上培养职业判断能力

会计教学的目的不仅在于训练学生毕业时即已成为一个专业人员,而且是在培养他们未来成为一个专业人员应有的素质。会计教学改革的首要任务,是如何着力提高会计专业学生职业判断能力的培养。会计职业要求不仅要具备良好的理论基础,还必须能够在实践中运用这些知识。会计职业判断就是在符合国家法律法规的前提下,如何在可持续的基础上为所有者价值最大化进行企业会计政策的选择与设计。     

城市轨道交通项目融资的偿债能力分析

城市轨道交通项目融资的贷款人并不是项目所有者,不可能从项目的投资中获得股本收益。因此,当贷款人在考察是否为采用项目融资方式建设的城市轨道交通项目提供融资时,所关心的重点是项目未来的偿债能力。本文在分析偿债资金来源的基础上,构造城市轨道交通项目的现金流模型,并从贷款偿还期、债务覆盖率、利息覆盖率、债务承受比率等方面,对城市轨道交通项目融资的偿债能力进行分析。     

Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non–US Setting

This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

铅锌冶炼企业的购并决策

文章重点讨论铅锌冶炼企业的购并决策问题。购并决策是一个过程,它包括对企业自身特点的了解,目标企业的选择、决策等问题。     

自动化驼峰作业预想控制法

襄樊北站驼峰自动化控制系统于2001年11月28日正式投入运用,根据该系统在运用中出现的问题及产生原因,通过采用自动化驼峰作业预想控制法,将人的作业经验与自动化精确控制相结合,取得了扬长避短充分发挥自动控制作用、提高编组站驼峰作业能力的效果。     

工程力学教学与学生能力的培养

根据工程力学课程的特点，从力学的基本概念、教学方法和教学模式上对工程力学的教学体系进行了分析，以充分调动学生的学习积极性，进一步提高学生的逻辑思维能力和综合解决问题能力，增强学生的创新意识和创新能力。     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.